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Tigers cornered

by Ranga Jayasuriya

One loophole in the ceasefire agreement is the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism. Three years since signing the CFA, this very loophole has opened up new questions about the sustainability of the ceasefire and the implications of the national security if the ceasefire agreement is to continue in the vacuum of an enforcing mechanism.

Of course, the presence of the Scandinavian truce monitors was expected to encourage the two parties' adherence to the Ceasefire Agreement in the absence of an enforcement mechanism.

The SLMM is indeed the enforcement authority, though the truce monitors have no real powers at their disposal against the ceasefire violations by the two parties to the agreement.

The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was set up under article 3 of the Ceasefire agreement to "enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this agreement" and the Head of the Mission should be the final authority on the interpretations regarding the ceasefire agreement.

The truce monitors could rule on ceasefire violations, but their determinations are not binding and failure to adhere to them carry no penalties.

"Not the rifle, dialogue is our weapon," one time SLMM chief Trygve Telefssen told this writer. But, looking back the past three years, it is open to question whether dialogue alone would help to rescue a fragile truce agreement which is at its all time low, having hit by the routine killings of non- LTTE Tamil political activists and Security Forces personnel.

When the request for a review of the Ceasefire Agreement was conveyed to the LTTE leadership two weeks ago through the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, LTTE political leader Thamilselvan rejected the idea, insisting on the full implementation of the full implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement.

Going by the recent comments of the LTTE leadership, for the Tigers, the full implementation of the CFA means the disarmament of the Karuna faction in the East and dismantling of the High Security Zones in the Jaffna peninsula.

But the killing of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar had changed the political thinking and the government has been forced to act with a firmness unseen in the past. And even Mr Helgesen - who echoed the LTTE line two weeks ago in Kilinochchi when he said the review of the CFA was "inappropriate" had been compelled to a re-think on the CFA.

Helgesen accompanied Foreign Minister Jan Petersen to the LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham in London on Thursday to convey the President's request for a direct meeting between the security forces personnel and the LTTE to "review the practical functioning of the Ceasefire with a view to prevent further killings and other violations".

The LTTE theoretician who is the first to feel the heat of the international fury against the killing of Minister Kadirgamar could have viewed the invitation as a way out from impending troubles. Only a few days ago that the British Charity Commission banned the LTTE front NGO, Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation in the United Kingdom.

Balasingham agreed for a direct meeting with the government and offered to send a high level delegation. He was quoted as saying that the discussions would be held in Oslo "within the next couple of weeks".

The meeting would be the first high level meeting since the Tigers's unilateral suspension of the peace talks in April 2003.

Admittedly, a review of the truce agreement is necessary for the very survival of the agreement. The CFA, when signed on February 22,2002, envisaged the cessation of all acts of hostilities, covert and overt committed by the two parties.

The Tigers ceased open hostilities, but shifted the strategy to targeted assassinations of rival political activists and military intelligence operatives.

Since then 40 military intelligence operatives and nearly 35 civilian military informants had been killed by the LTTE along with scores of non-LTTE Tamil political activists, according to army statistics. Over 400 civilians have also been killed during the ceasefire.

Had there been a deterrent against ceasefire violations in the form of an enforcement authority which would activate sanctions against violaters, the Tigers would not dare to have a free ride.

In the wake of roaring international condemnation of the assassination of the Foreign Minister- with the UN Security Council having condemned it, calling a "terrorist act," the Tigers would understandably be forced to scale down violence.

As only a few in Colombo and the rest of the sane world would believe in the LTTE's denial of its involvement in the assassination of the Foreign Minister, the LTTE leadership would be compelled to present to the international community more concrete evidence of its commitment to a peace process.

Last week LTTE political chief, Thamilselvan was quoted as saying that: "War is not an option".

"We are seriously interested in the ceasefire agreement."

"The most simple way to get the peace process back on track is by sincerely and effectively giving implementation status to the ceasefire agreement," he was quoted as saying in an interview with Reuters. "That alone is sufficient to get the peace process back on track for the parties to sit down and talk."

Understandably, the LTTE's acceptance of the offer for a direct meeting with the government stems from the growing international condemnation of the killing of the Foreign Minister, which is obviously the most striking illustration during the ceasefire that the Tigers have not yet given up terrorism.

The post 9/11 world has undergone a dramatic change in its political thinking; with daily car bombing in Iraq, bombing in London, Madrid and raiding of number of Islamic extremist cells in Europe, the distinction between freedom fighters and bunch of garden terrorists is increasingly blurred in the West.

In this context, the killing of the Foreign Minister would be a fatal blow to the LTTE's effort to redeem themselves in the eyes of the international community.

This would perhaps force the LTTE leadership to restrain his cadres as failing to do so would risk the functioning of the LTTE front organisations in the West, which are indeed cash cows, raising millions of dollars for the LTTE's cause.

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