No tears for Thamilselvan or bouquets for Ranil?

The reaction of the world to the death of Brigadier S. P. Thamilselvan, the barber who rose from the bottom to become the bodyguard of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the Tiger supremo, and then his 'peace dove with a beautiful smile' signifies the plight of the Tamil Tigers. The Tigers were expecting sympathy from the whole world.

Instead they got the works. It was like the experience of the man who had fallen from the tree being gored by a raging bull.

Their feeling of disappointment and despondency was expressed by the new Political Head, S. Nadesan , the former cop at Kirulapone Police Station. He told Lars Johan Solvberg, the head of the Peace Monitors that "the official silence of the peace facilitator Norway regarding the killing of Thamilselvan, is viewed with serious concern and is regretted by the Tamil population and the Tigers." If Norway was silent India was quite vociferous in rejecting Thamilselvan as a 'dove of peace'.

His death opened up the old wounds in India . All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam leader Jayalalitha lambasted Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi for "eulogizing" Tamilselvan.

She went on the offensive demanding the dismissal of the DMK government for violating the Constitution by supporting the banned Sri Lankan outfit.

She said Karunanidhi's "action of praising Thamilselvan", killed in an air strike by the Sri Lankan Air Force, (November 2, 2007) was unconstitutional as the LTTE was banned in India and its leader V. Prabhakaran was a proclaimed offender in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.

Sonia Gandhi's Congress too came out forthrightly saying it would "neither forget nor forgive those behind the gruesome killing of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi".

Union Minister of State for Statistics and Programme implementation G. K. Vasan said the state Congress would convey its "strong feelings" against the "misplaced sympathy" from certain quarters to the party high command in New Delhi .

If the Tigers could not get the sympathy they expected from the two sources they needed most - Norway and India - they could not expect any better from the other sources. In a report published on 'The Death of a Tiger' , the London Economist (November 8, 2007) called Velupillai Prabhakaran 'the brutal leader' He was the chief mourner and instead of getting some tea and sympathy he is bluntly called 'the brutal leader' of Tamilselvan. To rub salt into his wounds, V. Anandasangaree, leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front, labelled him as 'a lunatic' (Sunday Observer - November 4, 2007).

Clearly, Prabhakaran is getting whacked from all sides - both at home and abroad.

Of course, there is the usual quota of nincompoops who make inane statements on occasions like this. Lakshman Kiriella, who thought he was announcing a profound analysis, told the media that "the killing of political wing leader S. P. Tamilselvan will weaken the LTTE political section. However, he said that undermining the political wing could mean strengthening of military wing and said the country should be vigilant." With this utterance Kiriella qualifies to be the living example of the common saying that some can be considered to be wise until they open their mouths.

Perhaps, it is the media that should be blamed for letting our half-baked politicians get away with such unadulterated nonsense. Wasn't there a single media person to ask what difference there is between the political wing of the LTTE and its military wing? Aren't both wings one and the same? It is acknowledged that the military and the political wings of the one-man regime in the Vanni are inextricably intertwined. It is a regime that survives on waging war: there is no Prabhakaran without its killing machine and vice versa.

In other words, the political and the military wings are rolled into one with no distinction between the two. For instance, Brig. Tamilselvan was also its Political head. He wore two hats in one head - one with a smile and the other without a smile when he took sharp aim and hit his target with deadly accuracy. He was Prabhakaran's best marksman and that's how he came to be his trusted bodyguard.

So when the Air Force bombed their hideout in the Vanni there was no politics to destroy. Prabhakaran has been doing that systematically without any help from the Air Force. His primary mission has been to keep the 'Baby Brigades' at the firing line not only to keep their martial spirits burning at about 100 centigrade but also to create the illusion of winning for the Tamil diaspora waiting for an increase in the deaths of their fellow-Tamils at home for them to increase their funding abroad. So when did Prabhakaran make a distinction between politics and military strategies to strengthen politics over brutal violence? In the south, of course, there is a marked difference between the two wings. Ranil Wickremesinghe, for instance, kept the Security Forces confined to barracks, something which Prabhakaran cannot do because he is solely dependent on the blood supply of his victims for his survival.

Wickremesinghe, on the contrary, even pulled up his Navy Commander for defending the territorial integrity and national sovereignty by attacking a Tiger boat. In the Vanni Prabhakaran has no need to appease anyone. Without batting an eyelid he would have decorated his navy commander, Soosai for attacking the Sri Lankan navy. Besides, when Wickremesinghe signed the CFA in 2002 wasn't it the politics that came out of the Tiger guns that shot his CFA to bits? The most charitable explanation that can be given to Kiriella's statement is that he was caught unawares. After challenging the Security Forces to go to Vanni he was in a catatonic state when the Air Force actually went there and bombed not only Brig. Tamilselvan but even four other top commanders who were there throughout the night until that early hour of the morning wen the bombs hit them. Not even Prabhakaran has said so far they were gathered there just to eat hot, hot hoppers, early morning.

What is more, stunned by the unexpected blast that bombed the top Tiger command Kiriella tries to appease both the southern voters and the northern Tigers. To the UNP any military success is anathema because each advance into Tiger territory is another nail in Wickremesinghe's coffin. Wickremesinghe is like Prabhakaran: desperate for some success somewhere. When the Security Forces threw out the Tigers from the east both Wickremesinghe and his Kiriella, his 'chuck golaya', were denigrating it saying that it was just another piece of dust. But as the reality sank into public consciousness they realized that they had to change their tune.

Then out of the blue they announced that they had jettisoned federalism and the CFA.

This confirms that every advance of the Security Forces is forcing reluctant Wickremesinghe to change his politics. Even the status quo has placed Wickremesinghe in a dilemma.

Though he is wishy-washy on 'federalism' he cannot escape the political consequences of Thoppigala. It is this hard reality that forces him to reject the CFA - a disastrous blunder that handed the east to Prabhakaran on a platter. He has no option now. He can't go back to the CFA and hand over the east to Prabhakaran without a massive revolt on his hands with, perhaps, the Security Forces joining hands with the public. Prabhakaran will go along with him only up to the point that suits him. Prabhakaran has dumped everyone who had dealings with him - from Rajiv Gandhi to Wickremesinghe. Eventually, Wickremesinghe will neither have the north nor the south if he tries to revive the dead CFA.

In short, this means that he has no formula for peace because Prabhakaran will insist on returning to the CFA - the best deal that the wild man of Wanni ever had. As a co-signatory to the CFA, Wickremesinghe will also be under pressure from the international community to go back to the CFA. So Wickremesinghe's boast that he has a formula for peace, or that he is in the process of working out a formula, must be taken with a pinch of salt.

Nevertheless, in rejecting the CFA and federalism he is moving closer to the position taken by his political ancestors, voters and also that of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. In saying that he rejects federalism and CFA Wickremesinghe has gone only a short distance to accept the reality facing him. He cannot stand there forever because that is a position which is in the middle of nowhere. Besides, the moving forces are pushing him closer to President Mahinda Rajapaksa, whether he likes it or not.

All in all, the best choice available to him is to swallow the bitter pill and build a consensus by joining hands with President Rajapaksa. That is the only way open for him to win in the long run because all other avenues are closed. Since he is political leader who relies on his horoscope he should come down to earth and ask: if I get beaten each time I raise my head during the raja yoga what will be my fate as each day recedes from the peak of raja yoga? Besides, any attempt to stand in the middle of nowhere or to go in the opposite direction is not going to reward him with any political gains.The 'leaders' who have been advising him have not done him any great favour except to boost his ego with some publicity. Basking in yesterday's headlines has been his favourite pastime.

Also playing with little stunts here and there, with the aid of his obedient media, has not taken him anywhere.

The choice for him is clear: either to go into history honourably or to be buried in the morgue of yesterday's newspapers.

Pon Thangarajah's response to Mahindapala

Acording to the article by Mr.H.L.D.Mahindapala in the Sunday Observer of October 21, 2007.

Mr. Mahindapala seems to be under the impression that the UNP government 'Sinhala leadership' agreed to concede 46% representation to the Tamil people but that it was rejected by Mr. G.G. Ponnambalam who insisted on 50-50 in the forties.

Mr. Ponnambalam was appointed as Sri Lanka's UN representative by Dudley Senanayeke's govt in 1965. On his way to New York, he spent one week in London with us.

The leading Tamils in UK complained, how GGP missed the boat insisting on his 50-50 demand. When he heard about these complaints he wanted me to invite as many Tamils possible for him to meet with them.

I agreed on one condition that I would also invite Sir Oliver Goonetileke (former Governor General) who was then living in the residential block adjoining mine. Sir Oliver happily accepted the invitation. About 150 leading Tamils attended a tea party at my residence. Mr. Ponnambalam introduced Sir Oliver to the assembled Tamils saying "Sir Oliver, my good friends here are under the impression your government was gracious enough to offer the Tamils 46% power sharing but that I ruined it by insisting on 50-50".

Sir Oliver addressed those assembled saying, "At no stage did the UNP government offer any power sharing not even 1%, leave alone 46 %. This rumour has been going on for too long. Ponnambalam did not stubbornly insist on 50/50, polarising Sinhala - Tamil politics and lead the Tamil people in the North to the tragedy it is suffering today.

Let GGP's soul rest in peace.

I have been involved with the UNP from the days of my good friend late V.A Sugathadasa. I never heard even a whisper of ANY concession from any quarter in my association with the UNP all these years.

As a matter of fact the UNP always sabotaged any move for power sharing, from J.R's march to Kandy, to the burning of the draft Constitution presented by Chandrika Kumaratunga. When it was presented, Wickemesinghe's brainless buffoons made a bonfire of the document in the well of the Parliament.

The then leader of the opposition MR.J.R.Jayewardene was in London in Sept 1976 and wanted a UNP branch established in London. I organised this branch office with the support of Hon. M.H Mohamed and in the memory of late V.A Sugathadasa, who devoted his energy and resources promoting Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim co-existence in the multi-cultural society sharing the land in common with all the communities. The London branch was operated from my residence 10. Oxford Square Hyde Park, London W2 UNTIL 1983. After July 1983, I could not as a self-respecting Tamil continue to promote the UNP. Today everyone seems to be fighting for the Tamils!

Too many c(r)ooks have ruined the broth.

Pon Thangarajah

London