The Board of Inquiry (BOI) has concluded that orders and instructions given by former Commander in Chief President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and subsequent supporting orders given by the Secretary of Defence Kamal Gunaratne had not been conveyed by the former Actg. CDS/Commander of the Army General Shavendra Silva to the Field Commanders on time to quell mob violence on May 9th, 2022, which amounts to willful neglect of duty. As a result, the troops on ground could not prevent the damages to public properties and harm to persons.
The report of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) prepared by three-member committee consisted of Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda (Chairman), Marshal of the Air Force Roshan Gunatilleke and General Daya Ratnayake on the lapses if any the Armed Forces and State Intelligence Services during the recent Incidents Violence.
President’s Counsel Uditha Igalahewa appearing for Admiral of Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda filed this report before court when a writ petition filed by 22 government Parliamentarians representing Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) was called before the Court of Appeal.
Filing a writ petition in Court of Appeal, 22 government Parliamentarians representing SLPP and several others have sought an order directing the authorities to conduct a comprehensive investigation in order to ascertain as to whether former Army Commander General Shavendra Silva, or any other respondents have willfully disobeyed the orders given by former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to take action to prevent the damages to property and people following the attack on Galle Face protesters on May 9.
The report says: The delay precipitated a serious situation at Temple Trees, particularly to the lives of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, his family. as well as a number of Cabinet and State Ministers who were trapped at Temple Trees premises and also to the large number of people who had come to bid farewell to the Prime Minister.
General Silva had taken the initiative away from the groom Commanders to take appropriate action to quell mob violence as and when this ground situation demanded.
The IGP had acted on the same Intelligence report. However, due to miscommunication and poor assessment of the evolving ground situation, the number of policemen deployed were not sufficient to deal with the situation effectively.
The rioters had used social and electronic media live coverage to coordinate and carry out their violent activities on the houses of politicians simultaneously in many parts of the country.
A grey area exists in the conduct of General Shavendra Silva on 31st March 2022 and particularly on the 9th May 2022 which is questionable due to the follwoing reasons:
a. He had failed to rush the Army reinforcement to Mirihana in spite of having a contingency plan whereas the Navy and Air Force Commanders have acted promptly on the instructions of the Secretary of Defence.
b. He had disregarded repeated instructions from the former President and the Secretary of Defence to take action to prevent the damages to properties and people being harmed near Beira Lake at Navam Mawatha in the afternoon and to clear the mob along the Galle road in front of the Temple Trees in spite of having over 4,500 including five Battalions from the elite Air Mobile Brigade. Special Forces and Commandos stationed in different locations within Colombo city limits.
c. He could have easily dispatched the contingent of troops that was sent around 0200 hrs on the 10th morning to clear the Galle Road much earlier. Thus preventing the tense situation inside the Temple Trees that created anxiety among the Prime Minister and others who were trapped inside the Temple Trees.
d. Trying to justify his actions through media by giving an interview to a Sinhala newspaper on 29th May 2022 knowing very well that there is a BOI already appointed to look into the incidents, thereby undermining the purpose of the BOI.
e. For what purpose over 4,500 troops of Air Mobile Brigade. Special Forces and Commandos were brought by him to Colombo and were not deployed on time to save the Prime Minister, his family and others trapped inside Temple Trees.
f. These same elite troops were not used to quell the mob violence effectively in the other areas in and around Colombo.
However, the contingency plans prepared were not properly executed due to delays in deployment of troops at Mirihana.
The mob activity at Mirihana had not been detected by any Intelligence agency although the peaceful protest that preceded it was known.
On instructions of the Secretary of Defence, the Air Force and the Navy had reacted promptly and arrived at the location on time. However, it was observed that the Army had delayed in deploying their troops, which resulted in their inability to reach the required location on time due to the increasing numbers of protesters blocking the road.
On 5th of April 2022, instructions had gone from Army Headquarters to all Field Commanders to carry out reconnaissance of VIP residences and record the distances from the nearest Army camp in order to rush troops if the requirement arose.
Field Commanders had been informed by the former Army Commander not to deploy troops until he personally gives the order to do so. Field Commanders should have been given the orders to deploy troops depending on the necessity of the developing situation on the ground. In coordination with the Police in the area as emergency had already been declared by this time.
The orders given to deploy the Army so late had resulted in valuable time lost in providing assist, prevent damage and arson to properties.
Although more than 250 Army personnel had been deployed in Anuradhapura to protect Gnana Maniyo’s house, they were unable to take suitable action to prevent the damage and arson.
Army troops have withdrawn from the location where Minister Channa Jayasumana’s office was in Anuradhapura about 45 minutes prior to the arrival of the mob which set fire to the house, citing that the Police had not arrived at the roadblock as agreed.
The Board observes that the Army had not used minimum force required at most of the locations where they were deployed causing the violent mob to take the upper hand and initiative that resulted in arson and destruction to houses/properties.
At the Temple Trees premises, the Navy and the Air Force had gone to the extent of firing warning shots to disperse the protesters whenever their behavior became violent. This was done after the Commanders of these two Services gave direct orders to the troops under their command.
Due to the increase in mob activity with violence in areas of Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa and Colombo, a large number of Army troops exceeding 4,500 personnel which included five Battalions of the elite Air Mobile Brigade as well as the Special Forces and Commandos had been brought down to Colombo to enhance security.
Acting CDS/Army Commander had issued two sets of instructions contradicting each other.
In spite of clear written instructions issued by the MOD, former Army Commander had disregarded those instructions and given an interview to a leading national newspaper.
The interview given by the former Actg. CDS/Army Commander to a national newspaper regarding the incidents of 09th of May 2022 at Temple Trees while the BOI proceedings were taking place could be viewed as an attempt to undermine / influence the BOI proceedings.
The answers to the questions raised by the Board from the three Senior Officers of Air Mobile Brigade deployed in Colombo on 9m of May 2022, who gave evidence at the BOI, were influenced by it because their evidence supported the ideas given by Gen. Shavendra Silva at his interview with a Sinhala newspaper on 29th of May 2022.
Over 100 lawyers appearing for the rioters after the Rambukkana shooting incident and Mirihana mob violence has demoralized the Military and the Police.
Live telecasts of the incidents at Mirihana, Galle Face and Temple Trees in Social media platforms as well as some of the mainstream media platforms acted as an incentive for the public to take part in violent mob activity.
A well-coordinated contingency plan was not in place to deal with the situation at the President’s private residence in spite of serious agitations against him and also to deal with other situations that occurred throughout the country.
There had not been a proper command structure in place to command and coordinate the President’s security at Mirihana to deal with the situation that occurred on 31. March 2022.
A well-coordinated intelligence and operational contingency plan was lacking at all levels.
The Board concludes that the lack of legal protection afforded to Operational Troops for lawful actions has resulted in reluctance to act decisively at a time of necessity.