Sri Lanka held its long awaited Local Government elections on May 6. The election was to be held in 2022, but it was twice delayed by Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremesinghe ‘s Governments who feared electoral defeat.
The results of the election were interesting. The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) is leading 266 out of 339 local councils. The main Opposition party, the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) won 13 Local Government bodies, but neither former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s United National Party (UNP) nor the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), the political party of the Rajapaksa family failed to secure any. Two ethnicity based political parties, the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) won 42 Local Councils (ITAK 37 and SLMC 5).
On the other hand the national vote share of the NPP had dropped from 6.8 million at the November 2024 parliamentary elections to 4.5 million, a 34 percent drop. The Opposition political parties, especially the SJB and the SLPP, are trying to frame the result as the beginning of the end for the NPP. But the truth is far more complicated.
While the NPP has underperformed, the results are not indicative of a wholesale rejection or widespread disillusionment. In November 2024, the Elpitiya Local Government election that was held soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake was elected President, the NPP only secured 47 percent of the vote. The Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) only secured 44 percent of the vote in 2018 Local Council election, which was then seen as a decisive electoral victory.
To understand the May 6 election results, one must examine how Sri Lankans vote at the local polls.
Hyper-local factors
Local Government elections in Sri Lanka, while an indicator of national sentiment, are also decided by hyper-local factors such as the reputation of the candidate, caste ties, and even petty village rivalries. Ideology and party loyalty matter slightly less in the Local Government elections.
There were over 75,000 candidates, representing 49 parties and 257 Independent groups, and the NPP, despite its formidable national machinery, never stood a chance of replicating its 2024 landslide. Voters weren’t choosing between economic visions or foreign policy platforms; they were picking a neighbour they like to fix potholes and manage garbage collection. The Opposition’s glee over the raw vote decline misses this fundamental truth: local elections are about familiarity, not revolutions.
This was also the third election in nine months and voter fatigue had set in. Most Sri Lankans, especially the younger, the socially conscious and educated, were keenly interested in the Presidential and parliamentary election. However, there was little passion left for an election most people thought the NPP would win easily. Turnout hovered between 50-60 percent, a sharp drop from the 80 percent recorded in 2018, and the NPP’s base the demographic most likely to skip an election they see as irrelevant.
Low-turnout elections always punish incumbents, but they don’t necessarily reflect a loss of support. They reflect disengagement. The NPP’s challenge now isn’t just winning back defectors; it’s re-energising the millions who still back the Government but didn’t see this election as worth their time.
A low-key campaign
The NPP too is partly to be blamed for the drop in votes. The NPP’s campaign lacked the ferocity and focus of Presidential and parliament elections of 2024. This is a lesson for the NPP, the party must realise they can’t take their base for granted.
The NPP won in 2024 by promising a break from the old politics of intimidation and patronage and to eradicate corruption. The voters feel that the NPP has been slow in delivering these promises. There are also concerns about law and order, with growing violence associated with organised criminal gangs.
However, the Opposition has failed to capitalise on these issues, especially, law and order. The SJB won 13 Councils. The SLPP, though slightly resurgent, remains toxic outside its rural heartlands. Even the combined Opposition couldn’t dent the NPP’s control over three-fourths of local bodies.
This fragmentation in a way is the NPP’s insurance policy. As long as the Opposition remains divided between Ranil’s UNP, Sajith’s SJB, and the Rajapaksa loyalists, the NPP can weather minor setbacks. However, given that the UNP, SJB and SLPP have demonstrated repeatedly that they can come together to ensure their political survival, that’s a dangerous complacency.
The results have not weakened the Government, but the results also mark the end of the NPP’s honeymoon and the start of a harder phase. The NPP now faces a choice. It can dismiss the results as a fluke and double down on its current path, or it can read the results for what they are: a plea from voters to deliver on promises, and prove that “system change” means more than slogans. The Diplomat
